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1. Introduction 
 
The reform of primary commodity markets were at the centre of wider 
structural adjustment policies implemented in commodity-dependent countries 
that were facing balance of payment and mounting external  debt problems in 
1970s and 1980s. The reforms, which commenced under the aegis of the World 
Bank and IMF in the 1980s, principally targeted agricultural sectors of developing 
countries because of heavy dependence of those economies on primary 
agricultural products for foreign exchange earnings. In general, commodity 
market reforms emphasized liberalization policies aimed at transforming 
government-controlled commodity markets into more liberalized, market-driven 
structure aimed at increasing efficiency and boosting economic growth. 
Theoretically, liberalized markets are expected to create competition among 
commodity traders in both domestic and international markets and increase 
commodity prices and price volatility (Kruger et al., 1998; Hill, 2006); as well as 
increase market size (Voituriez, 2001). Despite having similar goals, different 
approaches have been used to implement commodity markets reforms across 
countries (Akiyama et al, 2001), leading to different outcomes (see for example, 
Han et al., 1990; Cuddington, 1992; Laroque, 1992; Reinhart and Wickham, 
1994; Crain and Lee, 1996; Shively, 1996; Larson, 1998; Cashin et al. 2000; 
Chaudhuri, 2001; Yang et al. 2001; Cashin and McDermott, 2002; Swaray, 2007). 
Specifically, the literature provides contradicting results on the impact reforms 
have had on commodity producer price volatility: evidences varying from increase, 
decrease and no impact.  
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These contradictions have important implications for policy and strategic 
decisions relating to market reforms and economic growth. In particular, they 
imply that generalized strategies such as measures proposed in the Doha 
Development Agenda of 2004, which place emphasis on market liberalization as 
a path towards managing commodity price risk poses a challenge because the 
benefits of reforms could not be realized in the same way in reforming countries 
(FAO, 2006; Martin and Anderson, 2008). This particularly warrants further 
evidence on reforms on producer price volatility for two major varieties of coffee 
grown in the East African Community (EAC)1.  
Principally, there is a common agreement that commodity price volatility is 
costly for both developing and developed economies (Larson et al., 1998, Karanja 
et al., 2003, Combes and Guillaumont, 2002, Bourguignon et al., 2004). However, 
the severity of price volatility tends to be higher for developing economies due to 
their high dependence on primary commodities for export revenues, investment 
growth, employment, income growth and debt servicing  (Chaudhuri, 2001). 
Hence, the search for rigorous answers on the impact of reforms is vital for policy 
decisions pertaining to: price stabilization programs (Deaton and Miller, 1995, 
Cashin et al., 2000), international market-sharing agreements (Cuddington and 
Urzua, 1989, Cuddington, 1992), risk management strategies (Reinhart and 
Wickham, 1994), and sensible development and economic policies (Deaton, 1999). 
The literature mentions several major drivers of commodity price volatility, 
including domestic market structures and policies, international price influences, 
                                                          
1 The EAC is a regional organization of five East African countries viz. Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, 
Rwanda and Burundi, Rwanda that formally came into existence in the year 2000.  
4 
 
non-compliance with International Commodity Agreements (ICAs), breakdown of 
ICAs and exchange rate volatility, among others (Borenszrein and Reinhart, 1994; 
Reinhart and Wickham, 1994; Gilbert, 1995, Morgan, 2001, Swaray, 2011). 
Therefore, the contribution of reforms needs to be envisaged and explained 
explicitly.  
Although commodity price volatility is a challenging phenomenon to deal 
with, market reforms are said to have positive outcomes such as reducing 
production and transaction costs and increasing share of export prices, which in 
turn are viewed as a compensation for price risk (Akiyama, et al., 2001; Larson, 
1993; Gilbert, 1997). Dealing with price volatility was not among the specific 
objectives of reforms but a vital auxiliary outcome with strong economic impact 
that raise several policy challenges, such as: how significant is the impact of 
volatility compared to the intended reform objectives? Since the impact of reforms 
differs across countries and commodities, should countries consider adjusting 
their reform policies as a measure to manage price volatility or should price risk 
management strategies be designed to suit the existing reform policies? These 
challenging questions cannot be answered with clarity without a profound 
knowledge of the magnitude of price volatility in specific countries, for specific 
commodities, and for specific market reform structures. However, since reforms 
involve liberalizing markets, it is reasonable to argue that price volatility is 
inevitable but manageable.  
In sub-Sahara Africa (SSA hereafter), coffee was at the forefront of 
agricultural market reforms in the 1980s. Previous literature on the impact of 
commodity market reforms focus largely on market structures and policies that 
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explain market performance, but fall short of addressing the price volatility 
challenge in SSA (e.g. Putterman, 1995; Temu, 1999; Temu et al. 2001; Ponte, 
2001; Baffes, 2003; Hill, 2006; and Baffes, 2006). This study, therefore, focuses 
on Africa, and specifically on coffee2 producer prices in the EAC.  
Specifically, the need for more rigorous up-to-date empirical study on coffee 
producer price volatility in the EAC is apparent for several reasons. Firstly, coffee 
is a major contributor to the economy of the EAC. On country-wise basis, the 
contribution of coffee to merchandise exports is 13.4 percent for Tanzania, Kenya 
(13.7%), Uganda (40.1%), Burundi (72.2%) and Rwanda (58.1%). Secondly, coffee 
is one of the most price-volatile primary commodities whose degree of volatility 
differs from country to country, with the impact on producers varying across 
countries, depending on the level of economic development (FAO, 2004). Akiyama 
et al. (2003) emphasize the importance of empirical work on the impact of reforms 
on commodity price volatility due to the rarity of literature on the topic, especially 
pertaining to developing countries. Thirdly, previous studies on the EAC coffee 
sector did not supply sufficient empirical evidence on the magnitude of producer 
price volatility and the level of volatility persistence. Finally, linking the impact of 
liberalization to producer price risk is important for policy-makers. This is 
because the literature, on the one hand, suggests that liberalization reforms tend 
to affect commodity prices (Akiyama, 2001; Yang et al., 2001); while on the other 
hand price risk affects producers’ investment decisions and the economy as a 
whole (Ponte, 2002; Cooksey, 2003). The relationship between producer decisions 
and price risk is paramount because producers are said to be risk-averse (Ady, 
                                                          
2 Unless specified otherwise coffee means coffee beans or unhulled coffee. 
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1969; Just, 1975; Holt and Aradhyula, 1990; Pope and Just, 1991; Rambaldi and 
Simmons, 2000), hence their decisions are functions of their risk preferences.  
Moreover, empirical evidences on the EAC coffee reforms provide 
contradicting and inconclusive results. On one hand, they suggest that coffee 
market reforms in the EAC have some disappointing outcomes due several 
reasons like: political interference, bureaucracy, and incomplete liberalization 
(Ponte, 2004), and their tendency to raise transaction costs of financing farm 
activities (Winter-Nelson and Temu, 2002). For example, for Tanzania, studies 
show that a series of local coffee market regulations and reforms from 1970s to 
2000s failed to meet declared expectations (Baffes, 2003) and led to a decline in 
producer prices (Putterman, 1995). Cooksey (2003) notes that the reforms were 
destined to fail because they could not take place to the extent claimed by the 
government and donors. On the other hand, they provide positive arguments in 
support of the reforms in the region, such as their ability to increase producer 
prices, reduce marketing margins, and improve efficiency in coffee auction (Temu, 
1999; Temu et al., 2001, Akiyama, 2001, Baffes, 2006).  
In response to the above arguments, this study aims at taking a step further 
by examining not only the effect of coffee market reforms on producer price 
volatility, but also linking volatility with differences in market structures and 
provide detailed discussion for policy implications. We employ the Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedascity (GARCH) model, using the dollar 
value of local producer prices. Our main findings suggest that coffee market 
reforms in the EAC are generally associated with increase in producer price 
volatility, but the reforms are not the only main cause of the increase. Based on 
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previous studies, we argue that other factors like international coffee prices and 
exchange rates might have influenced these changes. Moreover, we show that 
differences in coffee market structures in the EAC explain the extent to which 
coffee producers are affected by price volatility. We use these differences to 
discuss general policy implications with specific emphasis on price risk 
management. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
general overview of coffee market reforms in the East African Region. Section 3 
presents the modeling framework. Section 4 explains data and estimation 
procedures. Empirical results are displayed in section 5 and discussed in section 
6. A brief conclusion is given in section 7.  
 
2. An Overview of Coffee Market Reforms in EAC Countries 
Before the 1990s reforms, coffee markets in Sub-Saharan Africa were under 
heavy government control, within the framework of state-owned coffee marketing 
bodies. At that time, state-controlled institutions were considered necessary 
because of coffee’s importance in foreign exchange earnings and government 
revenue. However, coffee market reforms in EAC countries started in 1990s 
following a worldwide coffee sector reform agenda among producing countries. 
The reforms were motivated by many factors, including the demise of the ICA’s 
quota system in 1989 (Akiyama, 2001), forces from international financial 
institutions (IMF and World Bank); the changing view of development economists; 
and world economic events since 1960s. Indeed, there were transformational 
political and ideological views in favor of market-based approaches in commodity 
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markets. According to Deaton (1999), fixed-price policies are sustainable when 
world prices are stable (as they were in the 1960s) or in the presence of a 
stabilizing system such as ICA’s export quotas. However, in presence of price 
fluctuations, such policies were either difficult or impossible to maintain.  
The post-reform period has been characterized mostly by free market 
structures and competitive pricing. However, the market structures, timing and 
features of the reforms differ amongst countries. According to Akiyama et al. 
(2003), market reforms follow a sequential pattern based on priorities, whereby 
their design and process depend on the conditions facing policy-makers during 
the initiation and implementation process.  
Table 1 summarizes the features of coffee markets in EAC countries pre and 
post reforms. Specifically, the summary focuses on coffee production, 
organization and market structure from farm-gate to export channels. Overall, 
coffee production in the EAC region is done by smallholders, with the exception 
of Kenya where there are coffee estates. Before reforms, coffee markets were under 
strong government control in all countries, whereby these governments (through 
Coffee Boards) fixed producer prices. However, Ugandan producer prices were 
competitive even prior to reforms because private buyers and cooperatives were 
allowed to buy coffee from producers. Cooperatives played a significant role of 
unifying farmers and selling points at farm-gate, except in Burundi where they 
did not exist before reforms. In Tanzania and Rwanda, Coffee Boards were the 
sole buyers of coffee at farm-gate, through cooperatives and middlemen buyers, 
respectively. The other countries had a combination of cooperatives and private 
buyers. Mostly, producers sold unprocessed coffee beans (cherry) except in Kenya 
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where only semi-processed coffee (parchment) was allowed. Exports were 
channeled through government-owned auctions, except in Uganda and Burundi 
where the auction system did not exist. With the exception of Kenya, all coffee 
exports in EAC were done by governments.  
-Table 1 about here- 
The 1990s reforms brought some changes, but with differences across 
countries. The major changes included loosening government control in the coffee 
sector, thereby allowing private sector participation. The functional roles of most 
Coffee Boards were also reduced (except in Burundi). Private buyers were allowed 
at farm-gate, leading to competition with cooperatives. To some extent, this 
competition weakened the powers of cooperatives in Tanzania and led to their 
near disappearance in Uganda. In contrast, cooperatives became stronger in 
Kenya and Rwanda and were also established in Burundi (where they did not exist 
before reforms). At the export level, the legalization of private exporters led to the 
cessation of governments’ monopoly but introduced large private sector players in 
the sector. For example large vertically integrated private firms took over farm-
gate purchase and export of coffee. Detailed account of coffee market structures 
pre and post reforms is found in previous studies (see Ponte, 2001; Temu et al., 
2001; Baffes, 2003, Baffes et al., 2004; Lewin et al., 2004; Hill, 2006; Kimonyo 
and Ntiranyibagira, 2007; Murekezi, 2009; Boudreaux and Ahluwalia, 2009). 
These studies generally show that coffee market reforms had several impacts on 
coffee producers. 
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3. The Modeling Framework 
This study employs standard GARCH models in examining coffee price 
volatilities in the EAC countries. These models have become workhorse among 
time-varying risk models, replacing common measures of volatility such as 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation, which have no constant range and 
tend to overstate variability in non-trending series (Engle, 2001). A major 
advantage of GARCH models lies in their ability to handle the non-stationary 
conditional variance of the real stochastic process, which varies over time due to 
heteroskedastic properties of the time series (Bollerslev, 1986). Non-normal 
skewness, excess kurtosis and serial correlation are the common statistical 
features in commodity prices (Deaton and Laroque, 1992). These features explain 
a non-linear dynamic behavior of commodity prices. For storable commodities like 
coffee, non-linearity behavior prices is associated with the guarantee that these 
commodities never carry negative inventories. Hence, their prices are likely to 
show dynamic clustering patterns. GARCH models can capture these patterns 
and part of excess kurtosis in commodity prices (Tomek and Peterson, 2001).  
The practical application of these models is noteworthy as they have 
attracted many researchers and authors in similar studies (see Engle, 1982; 
Aradhyula and Holt, 1989; Holt and Aradhyula, 1990; Yang and Brorsen, 1992; 
Yang and Brorsen, 1993; Holt, 1993; Hudson and Coble, 1999; Yang et al., 2001; 
Engle, 2001; Swaray, 2007). According to Engle and Victor (1993), the application 
of these models has shown strength in analyzing volatility in financial and 
commodity markets, with GARCH (1,1) being the most preferable (Bollerslev, 
1987; Bollerslev et al., 1992; Engle, 1993; Rahman et al., 2002). Specifically, 
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GARCH models have been used in examining the impact of reforms on agricultural 
prices (see Yang et al., 2001; Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2005).  
Generally, the normal-error and the Student-t GARCH process can be 
expressed as follows: 
;  ~    (1) 
      (2) 
         
Where lnPt is the natural logarithm of modeled prices at time t, whereas  is its 
respective coefficient. t denotes the error term which is considered to be normally 
distributed, in the standard GARCH model, with zero mean and variance ht, 
conditional upon information set t-1 available at time . However, non-
normality in commodity prices may not be inevitable. Under such circumstances, 
Bollerslev (1987) suggests the use of the student’s t-density and relax the 
normality assumption (as applied in Yang et al (2001)). Thus, td(0,ht,v) represents 
the student’s t-density with mean zero, conditional variance ht, and degree of 
freedom v. The coefficients of GARCH effects ( and ) are used to measure the 
time-varying pattern of price variability, in which the sum of these coefficients 
measures the persistence of price volatility. If the sum of and  is close to, but 
less than one, it implies the presence of high volatility persistence.  
 In equation (2), the mean of conditional variance (mean- ht) can be used to 
measure the overall level of volatility. Moreover, in order to measure the 
magnitude of reforms on volatility (measured by the conditional variance, ht), the 
variance equation was augmented with a reform dummy (Dt)  as follows: 
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    (3) 
Such that,      
In equation (3), reforms will have the effect of increasing (decreasing) 
volatility if the coefficient of the reform dummy (r) is positive (negative) and 
statistically significant. This approach has been applied in other similar studies 
(e.g. Yang et al., 2001; and Karanja et al., 2003). 
Sometimes, GARCH coefficients are subject to admissibility and stability 
restrictions such that: , , , and  to 
guarantee the existence of unconditional second moment in  if . Some 
studies have relaxed the usual non-negativity restriction on coefficients in the 
conditional variance equation. However, the relaxation of non-negativity 
restrictions can only apply under certain conditions, such as modeling higher 
GARCH orders (e.g. Cho et al.,2003) and in extended GARCH models like TGARCH 
and EGARCH (e.g. Veld-Merkoulova, 2003).  Indeed, according to Nelson and Cao 
(1992), the non-negativity condition is overly restrictive, but the relaxation of non-
negativity restrictions may not be applied to GARCH (1,1) models. Moreover, the 
non-negativity is necessary when GARCH models are applied to generate 
conditional forecasts to the mean and variance, like in Aradhyula and Holt (1989).  
These stability restrictions also include the Integrated (IGARCH) in case 
, whereby the unconditional variance of residuals is infinite (Engle and 
Bollerslev, 1986, Harvey et al., 1994, Caporale et al., 2003, Dionisio et al., 2007): 
hence, it may not satisfy the definition of a covariance stationary process. 
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Nevertheless, this does not necessarily pose as serious a problem as it appears 
(Wang, 2003) because even if a GARCH (IGARCH) model is not covariance 
stationary, it is strictly stationary or ergodic, and the standard asymptotically 
based inference procedures are generally valid if the constant  is greater than 
zero (Nelson, 1990, Lumsdaine, 1995).  
4. Data and Preliminary Tests 
This study uses monthly producer prices coffee obtained from the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO). The data sets are categorized according 
to the two coffee varieties grown in the East African Region (namely Arabica and 
Robusta). Although producers in respective countries receive local currency 
prices, the ICO uses monthly average exchange rates published by the IMF to 
convert the prices in local currencies to US cents.  
The study used monthly dollar value prices of coffee producers, implying 
that the respective price volatilities are likely to be induced by other external 
shocks including exchange rate volatility of local currencies against the dollar. 
Indeed, most studies tend to examine producer prices as a percentage of export 
prices (which are mostly denominated in US$). The importance of using producer 
prices in US dollars is that the US$, despite the European Union currency, (Euro), 
still remains the currency commonly used to measure economic performance 
worldwide. Using the US$ dollar price of coffee makes it possible to compare and 
analyze economic performance indicators (such as GDP, exports, per capital, etc.) 
to the value attributed to producer coffee prices. It also helps to understand the 
real value of producer earnings based on the purchasing power of a relatively 
stable currency like the dollar. Progress towards the EAC, a common market, 
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makes a standard benchmark currency, like the US$, important for analyzing 
economic phenomena in the region. Moreover, domestic coffee prices in producing 
countries are to a great extent influenced by prices in international markets such 
as the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) and 
the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT). Trading in these markets is mostly in dollar 
terms. 
However, there were some limitations in the availability of data. Data for 
Arabica coffee for all countries was available from January 1980. For Kenya and 
Rwanda, data was only available until November 2004 and May 2005, 
respectively. For Tanzania and Burundi data was available until September 2008 
and March 2010 respectively. Robusta coffee data was only available from June 
1985 to September 2005 for Tanzania and from January 1980 to September 2009 
for Uganda. Therefore, our study is based on the most up-to-date data available 
for each individual country. The data sets were deflated using Commodity 
Beverage Price Index (CBPI) reported by the IMF, based in 2005 (i.e. 2005=100). 
Then, the time series of respective prices (Pt) were further transformed to natural 
logarithms (lnPt), where subscript t denotes monthly time series. 
-Figure 1 about here- 
Figure 1 depicts the movement of coffee prices for the periods covered. 
Overall, the graphs indicate the presence of some cycles and structural breaks in 
the price series. Structural breaks can be roughly observed in 1981 for Ugandan 
Arabica, in1993 for Kenyan Arabica, 1994 for Ugandan Arabica and Robusta, 
1997-98 for Tanzanian Robusta, and 1994-96 for international Robusta prices. 
These structural breaks in 1990s seem to have narrowed the gap between 
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international prices and producer prices in Kenya (Arabica) and Uganda 
(Robusta), and appear to correspond to changes in international coffee prices. For 
example, in the International Herald Tribune, Ipsen (1994) reported that ‘coffee 
prices soared by more than a third to their highest prices in more than seven 
years’ on 27th June 1994 in London and New York coffee markets. The price rise 
followed the news about a snap-frost in the coffee growing regions of Southern 
Brazil. In addition, on 13th June 1994, Rogers (1994) reported news about 
expected coffee shortage, and a significant rise in futures prices.  The period from 
1997/1998 marks a sharp decline in world coffee prices due to significant 
expansion in coffee supply against sluggish demand growth (Hallam, 2003).  
Significant price differences among the countries are also noticeable in both 
Arabica and Robusta. For Arabica, Rwanda and Burundi seem to have the lowest 
producer prices, whereas Kenya had the highest. Regarding Robusta, producer 
prices in Uganda appear to have overtaken prices in Tanzania from 1994, except 
in 1997 where Tanzanian prices seem to deviate from the sharp decline in world 
coffee prices.  
Descriptive statistics (see Tables 2) suggest non-normal distribution in both 
Arabica and Robusta price series, except Tanzanian (Arabica). The distribution 
suggests thin tails (except for Arabica in Kenya and Robusta prices in Tanzania) 
since the kurtosis in these series is far less than the normal value of 3. This 
platykurtic behavior may indicate that big shocks to prices were relatively 
infrequent during the sample periods. The evidence of positive skewness means 
that the density of the respective price series is extreme to the right, hence less 
chance of extremely negative outcomes. Where the statistics are based on price 
differences, the positive means indicate that the series have been dominated by 
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price increase in real terms. Negative means in Robusta prices (Tanzania and 
Indicative) suggest a long-run decrease in the respective coffee prices. Table 3 
displays the correlation matrices, suggesting low correlations between producer 
prices in the five countries (Arabica) and in Tanzania and Uganda (Robusta), 
except Rwanda and Burundi with a positive correlation of 0.72 in Arabica. 
-Table 2 and 3 about here- 
In practice, estimation of GARCH processes generally requires stationary 
time series variables data. Initially, we tested the data for stationarity using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), which has been widely applied and discussed in 
previous works (see Wang, 2003; Milas et al., 2004; and Dionisio et al., 2007). The 
conclusions from ADF test (not reported in this paper available upon request) was 
that stationarity in all price series could only be achieved with log differences, 
whereas log levels showed the presence of unit root. However, these results were 
suspicious because the real coffee price cannot be ‘truly’ integrated due to its 
historical tendency of having upper and lower boundaries. Russell et al. (2012) 
provide evidence of stationarity in coffee prices (levels), while questioning the 
traditional norm of assuming unit root in coffee prices.  Building on Perron (1989), 
it was reasonable to suspect the cause of unit root to be the possible presence of 
structural breaks in the real coffee price series, which are roughly evident in 
Figure 1.  
Following Elliot et al (1996), we proceeded to apply the DF-GLS (Dickey 
Fuller-Generalized Least Square) test, a modified Dickey-Fuller test with improved 
efficiency to capture unknown mean and trend. We used both forms of DF-GLS: 
the GLS demeaning, which only include a constant in the first stage regression; 
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and the GLS detrending, in which the series to be tested is regressed on a constant 
and linear trend. The DF-GLS, presented in Table 4, provide strong evidence of 
stationarity in coffee price series (log levels), except for Robusta indicative prices. 
In this case, Robusta indicative prices were investigated further by dividing the 
series into two sub-samples corresponding to pre and post reform periods (before 
and after December 1994, respectively), and test them separately. The results 
provide strong evidence of stationarity in the pre-reform sample, with limited 
evidence in the post-reform sample. Notwithstanding, further corroborative tests 
(ADF and PP), Robusta indicative prices strongly suggest stationarity in the post-
reform sample too. Eventually, our final conclusion was to assume stationarity in 
all coffee price levels. 
-Table 4 about here- 
Since we suspected the presence of structural breaks in the series, 
identifying breakpoints was vital before estimating GARCH models. With the 
exception of reform switching dates, an eyeball of the graphs could not easily 
identify breakpoints. Therefore, we applied a combination of Chow tests and 
Quandt-Andrews tests. The tests were applied for the entire samples and sub-
samples (pre and post reforms) in sequential steps for identifying multiple 
breakpoints. The applications and limitations of these tests are explained in 
Hansen (2001). In the testing process, an autoregressive (AR) process was firstly 
estimated for each sample series using ordinary least square (OLS). AR(1) was 
favored for all series, except Arabica prices for Burundi, Rwanda and indicative 
which favored AR(2) processes. Then, stability tests for break points were 
performed on each of the estimated AR models in two steps. Firstly, we tested the 
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entire samples assuming the reform switching points as known breakpoints (only 
applied in Chow tests). Secondly, we tested each sub-sample (pre and post 
reforms) for both known and unknown breakpoints. Our results for breakpoints 
summarized in Table 5.  
-Table 5 about here- 
Chow tests require the breakpoint dates to be known a priori. Hence, for 
entire samples, the assumed breakpoints correspond to the beginning of 
respective coffee market reforms in each country. The tests suggest regime shifts 
following reforms, except for Tanzania and Burundi. For pre and post reform 
samples, breakpoints were roughly presumed with the aid of an eyeball of graphs 
on four corroborative tests (CUSUM, CUSUM-SQ, recursive residuals and N-step 
probability), which are depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Quandt-Andrews tests 
do not require the break dates to be known a prior. Hence, they aimed at providing 
further evidence of structural breaks and corroborating the Chow tests. In most 
cases, the results from both tests appear to be consistent, with no evidence of 
breakpoints in Arabica indicative series.  
In order to make sense of the unknown breakpoints, we use the literature 
to determine any major events (global and domestic) that are likely to have 
influenced the structural shifts. Brief notes on these events (economic and non-
economic) are included in Table 5. As pointed out in Hansen (2001) and Russell 
et al (2012), it is unlikely for structural shifts to occur on the exact date of a major 
event; instead, a reasonable time lag tend to elapse for responses to take place. 
Overall, the identified break points roughly coincide with major events, suggesting 
the validity of the tests. 
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-Figure 2 and 3 about here- 
5. Empirical Estimates 
We estimate GARCH models in two forms. Firstly, corresponding with 
variance equation (2) without a reform dummy. Secondly, corresponding with 
equation (3) with a reform dummy in the variance equations. For each set of 
estimation, a series of dummies are introduced in the mean equation (1) in order 
to control for suspected structural breaks identified in Table 5. We use Maximum 
Likelihood in our estimations since this is the preferred method for univariate 
GARCH modeling (Engle, 2001). In the GARCH models without a reform dummy 
in the variance equation, our estimates were broken into three distinctive sub-
samples (entire samples, pre reform samples, and post reform samples). In these 
models, the impact of reforms is measured by comparing the results from pre and 
post reform sub-samples. For variance equations with a reform dummy, the 
estimates were performed for entire samples only, whereby the impact of reforms 
is measured by the significance of the reform dummy coefficient.  
The reform switching points were based on country-specific reform events 
as follows: Tanzania (from 1994), Kenya (from 1993), Uganda (from 1992), 
Burundi (from 1991) and Rwanda (from 1995). Indicative prices are merely 
modeled in order to have a rough comparison between producer prices volatility 
in East Africa (pre and post reforms) and international coffee markets. Therefore, 
their pre reform samples were truncated to 1991, the period roughly 
corresponding to pre reform markets in the whole East African region. Likewise, 
the switching point for the post reform sample was 1995, to cover the 
corresponding reform period in the whole region (that is, all the five countries had 
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undergone coffee market reforms). Estimates were made for the maximum 
possible available data as indicated in Table 2. That is, the estimated samples 
differ across countries. 
All the GARCH analysis assumed normal distribution of error terms. Each 
estimation process involved imposing a restriction on the target conditional 
variance. Diagnostic tests for ARCH were performed up to lag 4, and suggest no 
ARCH problem (see Table 8).  
-Table 6 about here- 
Table 6 reports the empirical estimates from variance equations of the 
GARCH models (with and without a breakpoint dummy in the mean equation), for 
both Arabica and Robusta prices. The reported coefficients in Panel A are for 
models without a reform dummy in the variance equation, while Panel B reports 
the coefficients for models with a reform dummy in the variance equation. In most 
models, the estimated coefficients for volatility persistence (  and ) are 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
Table 7 contains an analytical summary of the main results from the 
estimated models. In this table, percentage changes in volatility persistence and 
mean of conditional variance are calculated by subtracting the post-reform figures 
(current) from the pre-reform figures (previous), divided by pre-reform figures 
(previous), times 100. In case a reference sub-sample (pre-reform or post- reform) 
has two estimates (from dummy-controlled model and non dummy-controlled 
model), our selection of the appropriate model for comparison is aided by 
comparing information criteria (AIC, SIC, and HQIC), log likelihoods (LL) and the 
strength of the ARCH diagnostic tests. The target was to select a model, which is 
 
21 
 
more favorable based on these criteria. From this process, models with dummies 
appeared superior, except for Uganda (Arabica) and Tanzania (Robusta) 
The analysis, interpretation and discussions in this paper focus on volatility 
persistence and price risk (measured by conditional variances and standard 
deviations) following market reforms across the five EAC countries. For 
conditional variances, our measure of the impact of reforms on producer price 
risk is two-fold. Firstly, we compare the pre and post reform estimates for models 
without a reform dummy in the variance equation (2) (see Table 7). Secondly, we 
use a reform dummy in the variance equation (3) to make inference on the 
magnitude of change in conditional variances following reforms (Table 6 panel B). 
Overall, the conclusions from the two approaches and from the traditional 
standard deviations are consistent.  
-Table 7 about here- 
 
Arabica Producer Prices 
Our results suggest highly persistent volatility in Arabica prices for all 
countries, with more than 90 percent (but not all) of shocks carried forward 
monthly in all sample periods. Comparatively, volatility persistence in indicative 
prices seems to be relatively lower than each of EAC countries during all sample 
periods, with less than 90 percent overall and pre reform period. Overall, the 
1990s coffee market reforms in the EAC seem to be associated with increased 
volatility persistence in Arabica producer prices in three countries (Tanzania, 
Kenya and Rwanda), but slightly persistent decrease in Uganda and Burundi. 
Kenyan prices appear to have the highest increase in volatility persistent (about 
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8 percent), which is the same as the increase in indicative Arabica prices during 
the corresponding period. The increases in other countries were approximately: 4 
percent in Tanzania, and 2 percent in Burundi. The decrease in Uganda and 
Rwanda are approximately 1 percent and 2 percent, respectively.  
Regarding the overall price risk, EAC Arabica coffee producers appear to 
bear more price risk following reforms, except in Uganda. Just like volatility 
persistent, the highest increase in volatility was in Kenya for both measures: 
conditional variance (761%) and standard deviation (99%). The increase in 
Tanzania was approximately 55 percent and 59 percent, while was 77 percent and 
36 percent in Burundi, all based on conditional variances and standard 
deviations, respectively. Rwanda seems to have the lowest volatility increase: 30 
percent (conditional variance) and 8 percent (standard deviation). In Uganda, the 
decrease in volatility is about 76 percent and 55 percent on conditional variances 
and standard deviation, respectively: with reforms showing statistically 
insignificant contribution. 
Comparing the impact of reforms across the five EAC countries, Kenyan 
Arabica producers, despite being the most highly paid, seem to be the most 
exposed to price volatility. Ugandan producers appear to be the least volatile, 
followed by Burundi, Tanzania, and finally Rwanda. Before the reforms, producer 
prices in Uganda were the most volatile, while the other four countries had almost 
the same level of volatility (see Table 7). 
Despite these post-reform changes, the reform dummies in the variance 
equation (3) suggest that reforms alone had very little impact on price volatility. 
While reform dummies are statistically significant for Kenya (about 0.9 percent), 
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Burundi (0.1 percent) and Rwanda (0.5 percent) the contribution of reforms to 
price volatility was less than 1 percent in all cases. The reform dummies were 
statistically insignificant in Tanzania and Uganda. Therefore, reforms alone had 
minimal impact on producer prices. The reform usher in noticeable competition 
because it largely replaced state-controlled monopolistic marketing bodies with 
large vertically integrated private sector firms in the coffee.     
Robusta Producer Prices 
Overall, Robusta prices seem to be highly persistent in both countries 
Tanzania and Uganda, consistent with international prices (see Table 7). The post-
reform periods are associated with an increase in volatility persistence of 
approximately 16 percent and 12 percent in Tanzania and Uganda, respectively, 
while volatility persistence in international coffee prices appears to have increased 
by almost 29 percent. Specifically, the post-reform proportion of volatility shocks 
carried forward each month is relatively the same: about 95 percent, 96 percent 
and 97 percent in Tanzania, Uganda, and international prices, respectively.  
About the overall price risk, Tanzanian producers appear to have carried 
higher price risk than Ugandan producers during all the sample periods, but they 
are both higher than international prices. Coffee market reforms seem to be 
associated with significant increases in volatility based on our measures: 
conditional variances and standard deviations. This increase is consistent with 
international prices and Arabica producer prices. Like the entire sample period, 
Tanzanian producers bear more risk than Uganda producers following reforms. 
Based on conditional variances the volatility increased by 431 percent in 
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Tanzania, compared to 131 percent in Uganda, while standard deviations show 
an increase of 133 percent in Tanzania and 27 percent in Uganda.  
In the model with reform dummy in the variance equation, all the 
coefficients for r are positive, but statistically insignificant. Like on Arabica prices, 
this fails to provide strong evidence of the contribution of reforms on price 
volatility in the two countries. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficients is 
almost the same in the EAC countries like in international prices: that is 
approximately 0.2 percent in Tanzanian and international prices, and 0.3 percent 
in Ugandan prices. For Tanzania, this magnitude is similar with that of Arabica 
prices, while is it different on Uganda.  
 
6. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Our results on the increase in producer price volatility during coffee market 
reforms in the EAC are consistent with previous studies, including Gemech and 
Struthers (2007) on Ethiopia. However, unlike other studies, we show that 
reforms had very small impact overall (less than 1 percent), but more impact 
during the early stages of reforms (see Figure 4). This is likely to be due 
institutional adjustments during those early stages and as pointed out by Ponte 
(2002) that market reforms tend to increase price volatility because of the absence 
of stabilization mechanisms and involvement of the private sector in the 
marketing systems.  
It is reasonable to consider other factors, apart from reforms, which have 
greater influence on producer price volatility during reforms in EAC countries. 
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Theoretically, the major price determinants of primary export commodities like 
coffee are international market factors (such as commodity agreements) and 
international prices (Karanja et al., 2003). Previous studies provide evidence of 
volatility transmission from international coffee markets to domestic markets in 
small producing countries (Akiyama, 2001; Baffes, 2003). Specifically, according 
to Krivonos (2004) and Lukanima (2009), following reforms, the transmission of 
global coffee prices increased in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Mainly, this is 
because the EAC countries share of global coffee production is very small: not 
more than 1 percent in average (ICO data, 2011). Hence they do not have influence 
on prices (they are price-takers). Indeed, our findings show that changes in price 
volatility in EAC countries are consistent with changes in coffee prices in 
international markets for both Arabica and Robusta coffee. Also, from Figure 4, it 
is evident that the pattern of price volatility between domestic producer prices is 
identical to international prices, although volatility in international prices has 
always been lower than producer prices in respective countries. Overall, Figure 4 
shows an immediate increase (but short-lived) in volatility during the early stages 
of reforms for all countries. This may have been a result of the adjustment process 
among market participants and systems in each country. Other remarkable 
periods of high volatility include immediately after the collapse of the ICA in 1989 
and within the global coffee crisis between 2000 and 2005.  
Another influencing factor may be exchange rates. According to Gilbert 
(1989) commodity price volatility has increased with the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods currency agreements and that the consequence of higher volatility in 
meeting dollar-denominated debt has had an impact on commodity earnings. This 
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is consistent with other studies, mentioning exchange rate volatility as the major 
source of commodity price volatility (Doukas and Arshanapalli, 1991; Dupont and 
Juan-Ramon, 1996; and Jumah and Kunst, 2001). On Kenya, Karanja et al. 
(2003) comment, “coffee producer prices exhibit the highest and significant 
response to real exchange rates”.  
Moreover, we corroborate other studies suggesting that the magnitude of 
volatility and its impact on producers differ across countries depending on 
domestic market structures (Morgan, 2001, Akiyama, 2001, FAO, 2004). 
Therefore, although coffee producers in EAC countries face high price volatility in 
general, market structures are an important aspect for policy-makers. Looking at 
the mean prices (see Table 2), Kenyan producers receive the highest prices overall. 
This may be due to the fact that the Kenyan coffee structure allows producers to 
have direct link with roasters, giving them the opportunity to negotiate prices. 
Contrarily, Tanzanian coffee producers have been deprived from direct export 
until the end of 2003. If the Tanzanian coffee system does not take into account 
the extent of risk sharing, ‘domestic price drivers’ (like local traders and exporters) 
are likely to transfer their entire risk (volatility) burden to producers. This can be 
reflected in the price levels offered to coffee producers. On Kenya, Karanja et al., 
(2003) show the presence of risk premium content in coffee producer prices, 
implying that they carry a mark-up to cover against price volatility, and vice versa. 
Akiyama et al. (2003) point out that increased producer’s share of export prices 
may well compensate them for increased price volatility. In Tanzania, although 
producer’s share of export prices has increased following reforms (Temu et al., 
2001), there is no evidence on whether such increase is significant enough to 
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compensate producer for price volatility. 
-Figure 4 about here- 
Market structures can also explain the magnitude of the post-reform price 
volatility in individual countries. These structures, in turn, dictate the degree of 
volatility transmission from international markets (Akiyama, 2001). For instance, 
the coffee market reforms in Uganda is said to be more advanced and successful, 
with producers receiving prompt payments and doubling their share of export 
prices (Akiyama, 2001; Baffes, 2006). The post-reform correlation between 
Ugandan Arabica prices and international prices is about 72 percent. 
Rapsomanikis et al. (2004) show a strong co-integration relationship between 
international prices and Ugandan producer prices. This is consistent with our 
results on both Arabica and Robusta. This strong relationship can be associated 
with the direct export system used in Uganda: unlike the other four countries, 
coffee exports in Uganda do not follow the auctioning channel. The post-reform 
correlations between producer prices and international coffee prices in other 
countries are less than 70 percent.  
These findings have policy implications in countries with coffee auctioning 
systems. Temu et al., (2001) provide evidence of uncompetitive practices in coffee 
auctioning in Tanzania, thereby distorting the information contents of 
international prices and lowering competitiveness in the domestic market. On the 
other hand, there has been a concern on whether the coffee auction should be 
introduced in Uganda. Whether or not this is a good idea is still debatable. While 
the scrutiny of auction continues in Uganda, alternative views have started to 
emerge in other countries on whether or not their auction systems need reforms. 
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According to Baffes (2006), reforming the coffee auction systems will eliminate 
their mandatory nature, implying their eventual demise.  
Moreover, the evidence of slight increase in price volatility in Kenya, 
Burundi, and Rwanda and insignificant impact in Tanzania and Uganda, implies 
market inefficiencies as a result of incomplete liberalization of the coffee sector in 
respective EAC countries. Although the post-reform Ugandan market appear to 
be the most successful in increasing the share of producer prices in the 
international market (Krivonos, 2004), it has very little to do with producer price 
risk. Previous studies have mentioned some indicators of inefficiencies amongst 
EAC countries, such as: poorly organized private sector, poorly defined 
institutional roles and oligopolistic behavior in Uganda (Baffes, 2006); 
uncompetitive behaviors among coffee traders in Tanzania (Temu et al., 2001); 
corrupt and poorly managed cooperatives in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
(Karanja and Nyoro, 2002; Ponte, 2004, and Baffes, 2006); and delayed payments 
to smallholder producers, especially in countries with coffee auctioning systems.  
For EAC countries producing both Arabica and Robusta (i.e. Tanzania and 
Uganda), we see the same post-reform response for both types of coffee in 
Tanzanian producer prices. In contrast, for Uganda, whereas Arabica prices 
responded with volatility decrease, Robusta prices responded with volatility 
increase. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to investigate the causes 
of these differences, we can reasonably relate them with coffee quality issues. 
Uganda mostly produces Robusta which does not require quality grading like 
Arabica. According to Ponte (2002), Robusta coffee prices are less sensitive to 
quality than Arabica, and price volatility tend to affect low-grade coffee more than 
29 
 
high-grade ones. Since the worldwide coffee market reforms were associated with 
incentives for quality improvement (Akiyama, 2001, Russell et al. 2012), it is 
possible to argue that the decrease in Arabica price volatility in Uganda is an 
outcome of quality improvement. Nevertheless, further studies may be necessary 
to find the exact reason for this difference and its policy implications.  
The fact that coffee market reforms are associated with producers’ exposure 
to price risk leads to an important strategic and policy challenge of price risk 
hedging. Reinhart and Wickham (1994) argue that hedging strategies can have 
substantial importance in presence of volatility increase and when the probability 
of large destabilizing shocks is high. For EAC countries, the presence of high 
volatility persistence suggest that direct market interventions, like stabilization 
schemes and price guarantees by government, are no longer feasible after reforms 
because they may be expensive to sustain (Cuddington and Urzua, 1989; Deaton 
and Miller, 1995; Cashin et al., 2000; Swaray, 2007). Instead, as emphasized in 
Russell et al. (2012), our findings support the efforts to enable the use of market-
driven instruments (World Bank, 2003) like commodity options and futures for 
producers in EAC countries. 
Some studies show the benefits of market-based instruments in developing 
countries. These benefits include forward pricing, pricing flexibility, storage 
hedging, and support of commodity prices (Thompson, 1985), and on 
merchandising or production decisions (Tomek and Peterson, 2001). 
Furthermore, the benefits not only allow efficient resources allocation amongst 
producers in the production process (Gemech et al., 2011), but also they outweigh 
the costs for most producers (Mohan, 2007). However, just like the non-market 
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measures, market-related instruments have a number of bottlenecks, such as 
market thinness in developing countries, hedging costs, creditworthiness, 
feasibility criteria, mistrust, ignorance, basis risk, and exchange rate risk 
(Sorenson et al., 1990, Thompson, 1985, Reinhart and Wickham, 1994, Morgan 
et al., 1999, Pennings et al., 1999, Mohan, 2007).  
Therefore, recent initiatives by the World Bank and its partners prolong 
previous efforts to use market-based instruments for primary commodity 
producers because they are said to stabilize prices (McKinnon, 1967, Powers, 
1970, Kawai, 1983, Netz, 1995). In 2001, the World Bank led some initiatives to 
enable coffee producers in Tanzania, Uganda, Mexico, Nicaragua and El Salvador 
to use coffee options available in LIFFE and NYBOT commodity exchanges. 
Although coffee producers are said to be aware of the benefits of options, they 
appear to be reluctant in incurring upfront premium costs (Mohan, 2007, 
Lukanima, 2009, Gemech et al., 2011). This is sustainability challenge because 
hedging should not depend on donor funding. Also, under the World Bank 
approach, hedging is made to base on cooperative societies, most of them suffering 
from poor governance and lack of risk management ability, rather than individual 
producers. In Tanzania, for example, the implementation of options hedging 
mechanism (facilitated by CRDB Bank at local level) has almost failed because 
cooperatives are reluctant to incur the upfront premium costs (Lukanima, 2009). 
Previous studies (see Tomek and Peterson, 2001, Mohan, 2007, Gemech et al., 
2011) provide details and discussion on the implementation of the World Bank’ 
initiatives as well as the mechanism of options hedging for coffee producers.  
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There is also a debate on the geographical location of exchanges from which 
hedging instruments are found (based in developed economies): whether 
producers in developing countries should rely on them or should establish their 
own options and futures exchanges. The basic prerequisites for establishment 
and existence of a successful options and futures exchanges have been outlines 
(Thompson, 1985, Johnson and McConnell, 1989, Tashjian, 1995, Morgan et al., 
1999). These include demand for futures, existence of price uncertainty, 
asymmetries in characteristics of long and short participants, and the existence 
of competing contracts.  
Although, previously there was lack of interest in market-based 
instruments on the part of producers in developing countries (see Rolfo, 1980), 
interest has grown significantly over time (Faruqee et al., 1997). Morgan et al 
(1999) argue that the demand for futures exists since commodity prices are 
uncertain. This implies a shift in emphasis from unsuccessful intervention 
approaches that had been favored since 1930s towards a system that allows 
individuals to cope with the impact of price volatility, such as commodity futures 
and options. However, according to the Rabobank International (2004) developing 
countries accounted for only 2 percent of these instruments traded worldwide by 
2004. On the other hand, the answer to whether developing countries should opt 
for offshore markets or domestic market is a dilemma due to trading constraints 
for existing market and the cost of establishing domestic markets (Morgan et al., 
1999, Morgan, 2001).  
-Table 8 about here- 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the impact of domestic market reforms on coffee 
producer price volatility in the EAC based on time series data spanning over three 
decades obtained from the ICO. The results from this study reveal changes in 
volatility of producer prices of coffee in EAC countries after market reforms, with 
evidence of increasing volatility persistence. Although market reforms have been 
associated with increased producer price volatility, their contribution seem to be 
more evident during early stages of reforms. Instead, there are other external 
factors that are likely to contribute to producer price volatility during the reform 
periods. In the global coffee market, EAC countries are price-takers, hence they 
are vulnerable to global price shocks. Other contributing factors may be the 
demise of the International Coffee Agreements (ICAs) and mismatch of coffee 
demand and supply in the global market. The use of dollar value prices of coffee 
producers may imply that the volatility of producer prices, to some extent, 
explains the volatility of respective local currencies against the dollar. Overall, 
producer prices appear to be more volatile than international market prices, 
suggesting higher exposure to shocks. We propose further studies to explore the 
exact contribution and timing of other factors on producer price volatility. 
 This study further shows some differences in the extent reforms affected 
the magnitude and direction producer price volatility in individual countries 
across the EAC countries. Previous studies show that agricultural market reforms 
have taken place in different forms amongst countries. Hence, the stages, levels 
of reforms and market structures differ among countries. These differences are 
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likely to have induced different responses in producer prices amongst EAC 
countries.  
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Table 1 Key Features of Coffee Markets in EAC Countries 
 Tanzania Kenya Uganda Burundi Rwanda 
Start of Reforms 1994 1993 1992 1991 1995 
Producers 
 
Mostly small holders  Smallholders (60%), 
private estates (40%) 
Mostly smallholders  Mostly small 
holders 
Mostly small 
holders 
Coffee Market 
Control (Pre) 
Heavy government 
control 
Heavy Government 
control 
Heavy Government 
control 
Heavy 
Government 
control 
Heavy 
Government 
control 
Coffee Market 
Control (Post) 
Less government 
control but  more 
regulatory role 
Less government 
control but  more 
regulatory role 
Less government 
control but  more 
regulatory role 
No change  Less government 
control but  more 
regulatory role 
Coffee Boards 
(Pre) 
Owned by government; 
Controlling and 
coordinating all coffee 
functions from 
production to marketing 
Owned by producers 
with majority 
representation on the 
Board 
Owned by 
government; 
Controlling and 
coordinating all 
coffee functions from 
production to  
marketing functions 
Owned by 
government; 
Controlling and 
coordinating all 
coffee functions 
from production to  
marketing 
functions 
Owned by 
government; 
Controlling and 
coordinating all 
coffee functions 
from production to  
marketing 
functions 
Coffee Boards 
(Post) 
Less control by the 
Coffee Board but 
maintained the 
regulatory role. 
By 2002, the Coffee 
Board was the sole 
marketing agent; later 
on a number of 
marketing agents 
have been licensed; 
Less control by the 
Coffee Board but 
maintained the 
regulatory role 
In 1991 the Coffee 
Board was split into 
two: Coffee Marketing 
Board Ltd (for trading 
and processing) and 
Uganda Coffee 
Development 
Authority (UCDA) (for 
regulatory role) 
The coffee board 
(OCIBU) became 
a mixed private-
public company 
with government 
majority share; 
but maintained the 
coordinating and 
regulatory role of 
the industry 
Less control by the 
Coffee Board but 
maintained the 
regulatory role 
Coffee Purchase 
at farm-gate 
(Pre) 
Farmers sold coffee 
cherry (unprocessed 
coffee); channelled 
through cooperatives; 
The Coffee Authority 
was the sole buyer 
Illegal to sell cherry 
coffee; Small farmers 
sold processed 
coffee through 
cooperatives; estates 
sell directly to the 
auction  
Farmers sold coffee 
cherry (unprocessed 
coffee); Competitive 
market, cooperatives 
and private buyers 
Farmers sold 
coffee cherry 
(unprocessed 
coffee); channelled 
through local 
intermediary 
traders 
Farmers sold 
mostly parchment 
coffee; channelled 
through 
middlemen buyers; 
The Coffee Board 
was the sole buyer 
Coffee Purchase 
at farm-gate 
(Post) 
Competitive between 
cooperative and private 
buyers (until 2002, 
some of the private 
buyers were also 
exporters) 
no change  Competitive between 
cooperative and 
private buyers 
Private companies  Competitive 
between 
cooperative and 
private buyers ; 
Farmers sell 
coffee cherries 
and parchment 
coffee 
Cooperatives  
(Pre) 
Coffee buying points Coffee buying points Coffee buying points none Coffee buying 
points 
Cooperatives  
(Post) 
Weakened by 
competition and poor 
governance  
Increase in the 
number of 
cooperatives and 
strengthen marketing 
role 
Almost disappeared Creation of coffee 
farmers 
associations, 
unions, federation 
and confederation 
from 1996 
Strengthened role 
of cooperatives to 
promote specialty 
coffee, but some 
unsatisfactory 
governance  
Coffee Dealers 
(Pre) 
Not allowed  Not allowed Private buyers 
allowed; large 
number of small 
traders 
Private companies 
acted as 
subcontractors to 
government in 
collecting washed 
coffee 
Middlemen buyers 
at farm-gate 
Coffee Dealers 
(Post) 
Private buyers at farm-
gate and export 
Private buyers at 
farm-gate and export 
Emergence of 
middlemen buyers 
Emergence of 
private buyers 
No change 
Coffee pricing at 
farm-gate 
(Pre) 
Minimum buying price 
fixed by the Coffee 
Board (government); 
Delayed payments to 
producers 
Minimum buying price 
fixed by government; 
Delayed payments to 
small producers 
(cooperative 
Competitive prices; 
prompt payments  
Minimum buying 
price fixed by 
government 
Minimum buying 
price fixed by 
government 
(through OCIR 
Café);  
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channel), estate 
formers received 
payment directly from 
traders 
Coffee pricing at 
farm-gate 
(Post) 
Minimum price fixed but 
producers received 
competitive pricing; 
prompt payment from 
private buyers 
No significant 
changes 
More competitive 
prices 
 Minimum price 
fixed but 
producers 
received 
competitive 
pricing; prompt 
payment from 
cooperatives and 
private byters 
Coffee 
processing 
factories 
(Pre) 
State Owned, 
Cooperative/Producer 
Group Owned 
State Owned, 
Cooperative/Producer 
Group Owned 
State Owned, 
Cooperative/Producer 
Group Owned and 
private hullers 
State owned Farmers 
processed coffee 
using local means; 
RWANDEX the 
only miller 
Coffee 
processing 
factories 
(Post) 
Liberalized to allow 
private factories 
Liberalized to allow 
private factories 
Flourishing private 
firms causing almost 
disappearance of 
cooperatives 
Liberalized to 
allow private 
hullers since 2002 
Investment in 
private and 
cooperative 
factories; but 
majority farmers 
still use pre-reform 
means 
Coffee Auction 
(Pre) 
Owned by government, 
All hulled coffee sold at 
auction in Moshi; 
competitive bidding 
Owned by producers, 
All hulled coffee sold 
at auction in Nairobi; 
Competitive bidding 
No auction Owned by the 
Coffee Board; All 
hulled coffee sold 
at the auction 
No auction 
Coffee Auction 
(Post) 
The rise of Vertically 
Integrated Exporters 
(VIEs) and coffee 
repossession is said to 
affect bidding 
competition 
Producers receive 
US$ rather than local 
currency 
No change  No change Mombasa auction 
(Kenya) 
Coffee Export 
(Pre) 
Exports by the Coffee 
Authority and private 
exporters (mostly MNCs 
based in Kenya); all 
exports through the 
auction 
Exports by the Coffee 
Authority and private 
exporters (mostly 
local companies); all 
exports through the 
auction 
All exports by the 
Coffee Board (UCDA)  
All exports by 
Burundi Coffee 
Company (BCC), 
through the 
auction 
All export by 
government 
agencies (OCIR 
café and 
RWANDEX) 
Coffee Export 
(Post) 
Significant changes; 
export by cooperatives 
and private companies; 
from 2003 producers 
were allowed to export 
directly, bypassing the 
auction 
No significant 
changes; increasing 
joint ventures 
between local 
exporters and MNCs 
Significant changes; 
the coffee board 
ceased to be the sole 
exporter, but UCDA 
resumed regulatory 
powers; private 
exporters (local and 
MNCs) 
Significant 
changes; exports 
by organized 
private companies 
and the Burundi 
Coffee Company; 
direct export were 
allowed later 
Government 
agents and private 
traders 
Notes 
Pre means Pre reforms 
Post means Post reforms 
MNCs- Multinational corporations 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Normality Tests 
 ARABICA ROBUSTA 
 Tanzania Kenya Uganda Burundi Rwanda Indicative Tanzania Uganda Indicative 
Sample Start Date Jan 1980 Jan 1980 Jan 1980 Jan 1980 Jan 1980 Jan 1980 Jun 1985 Jan 1980 Jan 1980 
Sample End Date Sep 2008 Nov 2004 Sep 2010 Mar 2010 May 2005 Dec 2010 Sept 2008 Sep 2010 Sep 2010 
No. Observations 345 299 369 363 305 372 279 368 368 
Mean (level) 60.236 89.555 40.826 52.290 52.859 102.260 23.307 25.479 69.576 
Mean (change) 0.020 0.011 0.025 0.037 0.056 0.092 -0.016 0.023 -0.102 
Standard Dev. 18.143 32.604 21.355 13.734 18.058 15.684 14.413 12.901 17.183 
Skewness 0.054 0.851 2.613 0.526 0.892 0.522 2.114 0.473 -0.126 
Kurtosis -0.341 1.849 11.255 0.512 1.379 0.869 6.668 -1.011 -0.713 
Minimum 22.262 17.862 10.871 24.386 18.293 62.464 3.683 5.641 33.499 
Maximum 103.31 220.26 152.57 95.705 116.570 169.620 92.888 55.652 109.480 
Normality, (2) 
1.543 
(0.462) 
29.382*** 
(0.000) 
386.30*** 
(0.000) 
16.036*** 
(0.000) 
37.524*** 
(0.000) 
16.107*** 
(0.000) 
229.230*** 
(0.000) 
80.906*** 
(0.000) 
11.718*** 
(0.003) 
Asymptotic, (2) 
1.841 
(0.398) 
78.714*** 
(0.000) 
2367.600*** 
(0.000) 
20.718*** 
(0.000) 
64.593*** 
(0.000) 
28.613*** 
(0.000) 
724.590*** 
(0.000) 
29.384*** 
(0.000) 
8.786** 
(0.012) 
Notes:  
The data used in descriptive statistics is in real US$ cents (level), except for the mean (change) in which the first difference is used.  
Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
***, **Statistically significant at 1% and 5% respectively 
Table 3 Correlation Matrices 
 ARABICA (Jan 1980-Nov 2004) ROBUSTA (Jun 1985-Sep 2008) 
  Tanzania Kenya Uganda Burundi Rwanda Indicative Tanzania  Uganda Indicative 
Tanzania  1.000      1.000   
Kenya 0.219 1.000        
Uganda 0.203 0.312 1.000    0.113 1.000  
Burundi 0.184 -0.270 -0.137 1.000      
Rwanda  0.191 -0.207 -0.182 0.716 1.000     
Indicative 0.437 0.491 0.163 -0.023 0.123 1.000 0.436 0.224 1.000 
 
Table 4 DF-GLS Unit Root Tests 
Coffee Type 
With Constant With Constant + Trend 
Country SIC AIC HQIC SIC AIC HQIC 
ARABICA 
Tanzania  -3.153*** -3.153*** -3.153*** -3.225** -3.225** -3.225** 
Kenya -4.061*** -4.324*** -4.061*** -4.075*** -4.339*** -4.075*** 
Uganda -3.600*** -2.703*** -3.600*** -3.695*** -2.810* -3.695*** 
Burundi -2.318** -2.024** -2.024** -2.789* -2.471 -2.471 
Rwanda  -2.352** -1.743* -2.065** -2.442 -1.812 -2.153 
Indicative -2.973*** -2.975*** -2.975*** -3.562*** -3.562*** -3.562*** 
ROBUSTA 
Tanzania  -2.220** -2.220** -2.220** -2.719* -2.719* -2.719* 
Uganda -2.573*** -2.252** -2.573*** -2.812* -2.485 -2.812* 
Indicative -1.038 -1.038 -1.038 -2.435 -3.578*** -2.435 
#Indicative (Pre) -12.039*** -3.773*** -3.773*** -13.356*** -13.356*** -13.356*** 
 #Indicative (Post) -1.317 -0.719 -1.189* -5.854*** -2.257 -2.555 
Notes:  
The reported numbers are Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (E-R-S) DF-GLS test statistics 
***, **, *Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
MacKinnon Critical values (with constant): 1% = -2.572; 5% = -1.942; 10% = -1.616 
MacKinnon Critical values (with constant + trend): 1% = -3.474; 5% = -2.901; 10% = -2.590 
#Further tests were conducted using Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) for two sub-sample (pre Dec 1991 and post Jan 
1992) in order to avoid the influence of trend. The ADF and PP suggest stationarity in levels for each sub-sample. Pre sample: ADF statistics (-
10.285), PP statistics (-16.004), ADF and PP critical values are 1% = -3.465; 5% = -2.877; 10% = -2.575. Post sample:  ADF statistics (-8.996), 
PP statistics (-13.261), ADF and PP critical values for post sample: 1% = -3.459; 5% = -2.874; 10% = -2.574. 
2
2
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Table 5 Structural Break Tests 
  Chow Tests 
(For known regime shifts) 
Quandt-Andrews Tests 
 (For unknown regime shifts) 
  Entire Pre Post Entire Pre Post 
ARABICA 
Tanzania 
Jan 1994 (R) 
0.2232 
(0.800) 
 
 
Jun 2000 (a) 
4.5292*** 
(0.012) 
   
  May 2005(b) 
6.3718*** 
(0.002) 
  May 2005(b) 
6.3718** 
(0.030) 
Kenya 
Jan 1993 (R) 
2.6581* 
(0.071) 
Jan 1991(c) 
6.0540*** 
(0.003) 
 Oct 1993 (R) 
19.9476*** 
(0.000) 
Jan 1991(c) 
6.0540** 
(0.039) 
 
Uganda 
May 1981(d) 
4.9179*** 
(0.008) 
May 1981(d) 
10.7351*** 
(0.000) 
 Oct 1990(e) 
6.3129** 
(0.032) 
  
Jan 1992 (R) 
3.7164** 
(0.025) 
     
Burundi 
Jan 1991 (R) 
0.3742 
(0.688) 
April 1986(f) 
6.3164*** 
(0.002) 
April 2005(g) 
21.8431*** 
(0.000) 
April 2005(g) 
24.4134*** 
(0.000) 
April 1986(f) 
6.3164** 
(0.032) 
April 2005(g) 
21.8431*** 
(0.000) 
Rwanda 
Jan 1995 (R) 
4.7793*** 
(0.003) 
  Jul 1993(h) 
5.0511** 
(0.029) 
  
ROBUSTA 
Tanzania 
Jan 1994 (R) 
0.0059 
(0.994) 
 April 2005(b) 
4.8657*** 
(0.009) 
April 2005(b) 
6.4079** 
(0.029) 
 April 2005(b) 
4.8657 
(0.105) 
Uganda Jan 1992 (R) 
5.0517*** 
(0.007) 
Jun 1981(d) 
4.7991*** 
(0.009) 
 Jan 1994 (I) 
7.4210*** 
(0.012) 
  
Indicative 
Jul 1989 (ICA) 
3.0118** 
(0.050) 
Jul 1989 (ICA) 
2.5109* 
(0.084) 
    
Notes:  
The reported figures are F-statistics from Chow tests and Quandt-Andrews tests. Numbers in parentheses are p-values of the respective F-statistics. 
***, **, *Statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
(R) Break points within the year in which major reforms began. (ICA)The date marking the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 
1989 (a) There was a major plunge of coffee prices in the world market in from 2000 to 2002. In 2000 the Tanzanian government revokes buying 
licenses of private buyers from farm-gate as a measure to ensure loans guaranteed to cooperatives (which had financial difficulties) are paid. The 
restriction continued until 2002 (Krivonos, 2004). (b) The year 2005 marks the end of the coffee crisis that began in 1999. (c) Establishment of the 
Kenyan Coffee Growers Association (KCGA), followed by several policy measures in the Kenyan coffee sector. (d) From February 1981, the Uganda 
experienced a civil war until 1985. In 1986, the new government (under Yoweri Museveni) started to implement structural adjustment programmes, 
including exchange rate adjustments. Coffee being one of Museven´s priority, the government started coffee rehabilitation programmes in the same 
year, which included raising producer coffee prices in May 1986 and February 1987. (e) Following the demise of the International Coffee Agreement 
(ICA) in July 1989, Ugandan coffee prices began to decline like the rest of coffee producing countries. Coffee production declined by almost 20% 
in 1990. This forced the implementation of several reforms in 1990, as part of structural adjustment programmes, followed by major coffee reforms 
from 1992 (Akiyama, 2001, Baffes, 2006). (f) The year 1986 marked partial privatization of public enterprises following worldwide structural 
adjustments advocated by the World Bank and IFM. The coffee sector, which was entirely under government control, was a major priority for 
privatization in 1986. (g) Major policy reforms were made in 2005 aiming at deregulating and privatizing the coffee sector in Burundi. In January 
2005 a presidential decree was signed to allow full access of the private sector, in the same year the Burundian government ended guaranteeing 
funds to the coffee sector, including loans to coffee companies and growers. In June 2005, a ministerial decree was signed to end the monopoly of 
the Coffee Board (OCIBU), deregulating prices, and direct coffee export (without passing through OCIBU). The same year also witnessed the rise 
of coffee prices in the global market (Kimonyo and Ntiranyibagira, 2007). (h) 1993 was the peak of the Rwandan Civil war, which affected the coffee 
sector and the whole country economy. (i) More reforms took place in Uganda. The Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA) was established 
in April 1994, followed by the Coffee Regulation of 1994. Among other things, the regulation focused on the registration of coffee dealers in the 
internal and export supply chain, coffee quality control, and publication of marketing and pricing information. Also 1994-1995 witnessed the rise of 
international coffee prices and booming of the Ugandan coffee sector. 
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Table 6 GARCH (1,1) Estimates of Producer Coffee Prices in EAC Countries 
Coefficients   Sample 
ARABICA ROBUSTA 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Burundi Rwanda Indicative Tanzania Uganda Indicative 
Panel A (i) 
# 
Entire 
0.0078*** 
(a)0.0073*** 
0.0028*** 
(c)0.0043*** 
0.0122*** 
(e)0.0043*** 
0.0038*** 
(g)0.0024*** 
0.0031*** 
(j)0.0040*** 
0.0027*** 0.0200*** 
(k)0.0179*** 
0.0269*** 
(l)0.0112*** 
0.0067*** 
(m)0.0013*** 
Pre 
0.0059*** 0.0022*** 
(d)0.0023*** 
0.0084*** 
(f)0.0086*** 
0.0018*** 
(h)0.0024*** 
0.0031*** 0.0024*** 0.0193*** 
 
0.0097*** 
(f)0.0117*** 
0.0012*** 
(m)0.0010*** 
Post 
0.0073*** 
(b)0.0058*** 
0.0003*** 0.0030*** 0.0021*** 
(i)0.0025*** 
0.0067*** 0.0029*** 0.0279*** 
(i)0.0189*** 
0.0071*** 0.0031*** 
Panel A (ii) 
 
Entire 
0.9437*** 
(0.000) 
(a)0.9469*** 
(0.000) 
0.5791*** 
(0.000) 
(c)0.8644*** 
(0.000) 
0.8597*** 
(0.000) 
(e)0.7566*** 
(0.000) 
0.9957*** 
(0.000) 
(g)0.9751*** 
(0.000) 
0.9574*** 
(0.000) 
(j)0.9625*** 
(0.000) 
0.9461*** 
(0.000) 
0.9605*** 
(0.000) 
(k)0.9681*** 
(0.000) 
1.0032*** 
(0.000) 
(l)0.9569*** 
(0.000) 
1.3529*** 
(0.000) 
(m)1.0249*** 
(0.000) 
Pre 
0.9291*** 
(0.000) 
0.9815*** 
(0.000) 
(d)0.8813*** 
(0.000) 
0.9579*** 
(0.000) 
(f)0.9191*** 
(0.000) 
1.0532*** 
(0.000) 
(h)1.0949*** 
(0.000) 
0.9758*** 
(0.000) 
0.8773*** 
(0.000) 
0.9350*** 
(0.000) 
0.9577*** 
(0.000) 
(f)0.9102*** 
(0.000) 
1.0256*** 
(0.000) 
(m)0.8069*** 
(0.000) 
Post 
0.9673*** 
(0.000) 
(b)0.9434*** 
(0.000) 
0.2634*** 
(0.000) 
0.5760*** 
(0.000) 
0.7860*** 
(0.000) 
(i)0.9265*** 
(0.000) 
0.9547*** 
(0.000) 
0.9155*** 
(0.000) 
0.9673*** 
(0.000) 
(i)0.9801*** 
(0.000) 
0.7576*** 
(0.000) 
1.2800*** 
(0.000) 
Panel A (iii) 
 
Entire 
-0.0082*** 
(0.000) 
(a)-0.0078*** 
(0.000) 
0.4026*** 
(0.000) 
(c)0.0853** 
(0.044) 
0.0921 
(0.231) 
(e)0.1937*** 
(0.012) 
-0.0474*** 
(0.004) 
(g)-0.0087 
(0.878) 
0.0177 
(0.132) 
(j)-0.0095 
(0.934) 
0.0562 
(0.344) 
-0.0128*** 
(0.000) 
(k)-0.0115 
(0.917) 
-0.0851 
(0.488) 
(l)-0.0389* 
(0.095) 
-0.4419*** 
(0.000) 
(m)-0.0480 
(0.659) 
Pre 
-0.0280 
(0.773) 
-0.0149 
(0.837) 
(d)0.0468 
(0.492) 
0.0147 
(0.833) 
(f)0.0304 
(0.752) 
0.0892 
(0.129) 
(h)-0.1474*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0180 
(0.860) 
-0.0431 
(0.649) 
-0.1178 
(0.584) 
-0.0315*** 
(0.000) 
(f)-0.0460*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0884 
(0.485) 
(m)-0.0578 
(0.599) 
Post 
-0.0078*** 
(0.000) 
(b)-0.0091 
(0.869) 
0.7354*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.3821*** 
(0.000) 
0.1890*** 
(0.001) 
(i)0.0421 
(0.637) 
-0.0143 
(0.927) 
-0.0113 
(0.955) 
-0.0179*** 
(0.000) 
(i)-0.0121 
(0.928) 
0.2062*** 
(0.000) 
-0.3133*** 
(0.007) 
Panel B 
Models with reform 
dummies in the 
variance equation (3) 
# 0.0057*** 0.0022*** 0.0058*** 0.0017*** 0.0019*** 0.0027*** 0.0174*** 0.0094*** 0.0010*** 
 
0.9610*** 
(0.000) 
0.9836*** 
(0.000) 
0.7441*** 
(0.000) 
0.9975*** 
(0.000) 
0.9934*** 
(0.000) 
0.9451*** 
(0.000) 
0.9702*** 
(0.000) 
0.9622*** 
(0.000) 
1.0221*** 
(0.000) 
 
-0.0079*** 
(0.000) 
-0.0090 
(0.841) 
0.2007*** 
(0.009) 
-0.0213 
(0.715) 
-0.0151 
(0.834) 
0.0574 
(0.341) 
-0.0123 
(0.787) 
-0.0307 
(0.474) 
-0.0422 
(0.606) 
r
 0.0016 
(0.416) 
0.0087*** 
(0.007) 
-0.0010 
(0.466) 
0.0013* 
(0.096) 
0.0048** 
(0.019) 
(m)-0.0001 
(0.907) 
0.0018 
(0.529) 
0.0026 
(0.368) 
(m)0.0018 
(0.106) 
 
Notes: 
Numbers in parentheses are  p-values of the respective estimated coefficients.  






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***, **,* Statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
#All the constant coefficients have no standard error, indicating that it is on the boundary of the parameter space: hence it is effectively zero. 
For each sample (Entire, pre and post), the top row reports the results for models without breakpoint dummies in the mean equation, while the bottom row reports the results for models with breakpoint dummies in 
the mean equation (where applicable). Superscript letters in brackets identify models with breakpoint dummies in the mean equation, such that: (a) Reform year dummy Jan 1994; (b) Breakpoint dummies June 2000 
and May 2005; (c) Reform year dummies Jan 1993 and Oct 1993; (d) Breakpoint dummies June 2000 and May 2005; (e) Breakpoint dummies May 1981, Oct 1990, and Jan 1992; (f) Breakpoint dummy May 1981 (for 
Arabica) or Jun 1981 (for Robusta); (g) Reform year dummy Jan 1991 and breakpoint dummy April 2005; (h) Breakpoint dummy April 1986; (i) Breakpoint dummy April 2005; (j) Reform year dummy Jan 1995 and 
breakpoint dummy Jul 1993; (k) Reform year dummy Jan 1994 and breakpoint dummy April 2005; (l) Reform year dummy Jan 1992 and breakpoint dummy Jan 1994; (m) Breakpoint dummy Jul 1989 for ICA collapse. 
Otherwise, coefficients without superscript letter are for models without breakpoint dummies in the mean equation. 
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Table 7 Persistence and Volatility in Producer Prices in EAC Countries and Reform Effects: Summary 
Type of 
Coffee  Sample 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Burundi Rwanda Indicative 
GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH GARCH 
ARABICA 
Persistence  
 
Entire 
0.9354 
(a)0.9390 
0.9817 
(c)0.9497 
0.9518 
(e)0.9504 
0.9484 
(g)0.9654 
0.9751 
(j)0.9530 
0.8899 
Pre 
0.9010 0.9666 
(d)0.9281 
0.9726 
(f)0.9496 
0.9640 
(h)0.9474 
0.9578 0.8342 
Post 
0.9595 
(b)0.9343 
0.9988 0.9581 0.9750 
(i)0.9686 
0.9403 0.9042 
Change Increase (4%) Increase (8%) Decrease (-1%) Increase (2%) Decrease (-2%) Increase (8%) 
Mean of 
conditional 
variance (ht) 
Entire 0.1189 0.1553 0.2533 0.0736 0.1226 0.0240 
Pre 0.0585 0.0316 0.3087 0.0461 0.0738 0.0144 
Post 0.0905 0.2718 0.0745 0.0814 0.1105 0.0306 
Change Increase (55%) Increase (761%) Decrease (-76%) Increase (77%) Increase (30%) Increase (113%) 
Standard 
deviation of 
log prices
 
Entire 0.3350 0.3943 0.4691 0.2680 0.3476 0.1527 
Pre 0.2380 0.2471 0.5508 0.2162 0.2701 0.1171 
Post 0.3796 0.4909 0.2469 0.2930 0.2910 0.1748 
 Change Increase (59%) Increase (99%) Decrease (-55%) Increase (36%) Increase (8%) Increase (49%) 
ROBUSTA 
Persistence  
 
Entire 
0.9477 
(k)0.9566 
 0.9181 
(l)0.9179 
  0.9110 
(m)0.9768 
Pre 
0.8172  0.9262 
(f)0.8642 
  0.9372 
(m)0.7491 
Post 
0.9494 
(i)0.9681 
 0.9638   0.9667 
Change Increase (16%)  Increase (12%)   Increase (29%) 
Mean of 
conditional 
variance (ht)
 
Entire 0.3826  0.3282   0.0755 
Pre 0.1044  0.0863   0.0189 
Post 0.5539  0.1998   0.0927 
Change Increase (431%)  Increase (131%)   Increase (391%) 
Standard 
deviation of 
log prices
 
Entire 0.6077  0.5392   0.2673 
Pre 0.3007  0.3601   0.1287 
Post 0.7009  0.4558   0.2763 
Change Increase (133%)  Increase (27%)   Increase (115%) 
Notes:  
Change: indicates the impact of reforms (either increase, decrease or unchanged) of a volatility measure 
For each sample (Entire, pre and post), the top row reports the results for models without breakpoint dummies in the mean equation, while the bottom row reports the results for models with breakpoint dummies in 
the mean equation (where applicable). Superscript letters in brackets identify models with breakpoint dummies in the mean equation, such that: (a) Reform year dummy Jan 1994; (b) Breakpoint dummies June 2000 
1
1
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and May 2005; (c) Reform year dummies Jan 1993 and Oct 1993; (d) Breakpoint dummies June 2000 and May 2005; (e) Breakpoint dummies May 1981, Oct 1990, and Jan 1992; (f) Breakpoint dummy May 1981 (for 
Arabica) or Jun 1981 (for Robusta); (g) Reform year dummy Jan 1991 and breakpoint dummy April 2005; (h) Breakpoint dummy April 1986; (i) Breakpoint dummy April 2005; (j) Reform year dummy Jan 1995 and 
breakpoint dummy Jul 1993; (k) Reform year dummy Jan 1994 and breakpoint dummy April 2005; (l) Reform year dummy Jan 1992 and breakpoint dummy Jan 1994; (m) Breakpoint dummy Jul 1989 for ICA collapse. 
Otherwise, coefficients without superscript letter are for models without breakpoint dummies in the mean equation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 ARCH Diagnostic Tests 
Without 
Dummies 
Sample 
ARABICA ROBUSTA 
Tanzania Kenya  Uganda Burundi Rwanda Indicative Tanzania Uganda Indicative 
Entire 
0.2804 
(0.89) 
1.9261 
(0.106) 
0.1503 
(0.963) 
1.0266 
(0.393) 
1.4527 
(0.217) 
1.3993 
(0.234) 
0.0105 
(0.999) 
0.1471 
(0.964) 
1.1062 
(0.353) 
Pre 
1.1788 
(0.32) 
0.7451 
(0.563) 
0.0460 
(0.996) 
1.2542 
(0.292) 
0.8624 
(0.488) 
0.6688 
(0.615) 
0.0017 
(1.000) 
0.7852 
(0.537) 
0.6431 
(0.633) 
Post 
0.3206 
(0.86) 
1.6505 
(0.165) 
1.6330 
(0.167) 
0.4131 
(0.799) 
0.6728 
(0.612) 
1.0118 
(0.403) 
0.0170 
(0.999) 
0.3203 
(0.864) 
0.4569 
(0.767) 
With 
Dummies 
Entire 
0.2939 
(0.88) 
1.5192 
(0.197) 
0.7561 
(0.555) 
0.9135 
(0.456) 
0.5334 
(0.711) 
NA 
0.0288 
(0.998) 
0.3746 
(0.827) 
0.5516 
(0.698) 
Pre NA 
0.4602 
(0.765) 
0.0342 
(0.999) 
1.2674 
(0.287) 
NA NA NA 
1.0430 
(0.388) 
0.3307 
(0.857) 
Post 
0.0814 
(0.99) 
NA NA 
0.1170 
(0.976) 
NA NA 
0.0584 
(0.994) 
NA NA 
Entire (e3) 
0.3179 
(0.866) 
0.7597 
(0.552) 
0.8801 
(0.476) 
1.2612 
(0.285) 
0.6370 
(0.637) 
1.4129 
(0.227) 
0.0258 
(0.999) 
0.4174 
(0.796) 
0.3805 
(0.823) 
Notes: 
Numbers in parentheses are p-values of the respective estimated coefficients.  
NA: not applicable because no breakpoint was identified. 
  Entire (e3): Tests for equation (3) with reform dummies in the variance equation 
